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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BIBLE DISTRIBUTION
IN PUBLIC SCHOOL BANNED
The defendant Board of Education planned to allow the distribution
through its school facilities, by the Gideons International, excerpts from
the King James Bible to students whose parents so requested. An injunc-
tion to halt the distribution by the school board was sought by Jewish
and Catholic parents whose children attended the school, on the grounds
that such distribution would be unconstitutional. Such a distribution was
held to be unconstitutional as a violation of Amendments One and Four-
teen of the United States Constitution, and article one, paragraph four of
the New Jersey Constitution.' Tudor v. Board of Education of Borough
of Rutherford, 100 A. 2d 857 (N.J., 1953).
The New Jersey court in the Tudor case bases its adjudication on the
preference of one religion over others by the school board. If the facts of
the case support a finding of a preference, such a preference of one reli-
gion over another would be unconstitutional. 2 The finding of a preference
was based on the sectarian nature of the Bible excerpts to be distributed,
the testimony at the trial indicating that this version was unacceptable to
the Jewish and Catholic religions.8
The Court stated in its opinion:
Our decision in this case must be based upon the undoubted doctrine of both
the Federal Constitution and our New Jersey Constitution, that the state or
any instrumentality thereof cannot under any circumstances show a preference
for one religion over another. 4
The United States Supreme Court has considered the relation of the
school system to religion under the United States Constitution in several
recent cases. The First Amendment, with regard to its prohibition against
governmental action abridging religious freedom, is applicable to the
states, as well as to the federal government, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 The supplying of text books8 and reimbursement for trans-
1N.J. Const. Art. 1, § 4. "There shall be no establishment of one religious
sect, in preference to another."
2 Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
People ex rel. McCqllum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
3Tudor v. Board of Education, 100 A. 2d 857, 865 (N.J., 1953).
4Ibid., at 864, 865.
5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
6 Cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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portation costs on public buses7 to private school children was held consti-
tutional, as the aid was considered in furtherance of a public purpose and
as a service to the individual recipients, rather than the support of a reli-
gious denomination, analogous to police and fire protection given to
religious property. However, the use of school premises during school
hours for the conduct of sectarian instruction by religious groups was de-
cided to be unconstitutional, as a use of tax supported facilities for dis-
semination of religious doctrine.8 This decision, however, was distin-
guished in a subsequent released-time case, on the basis that the physical
facilities of the school were not used and the mere excuse of pupils to
attend sectarian instruction from school time is not unconstitutional. The
"accommodation" of religion by the school was approved in this case, so
long as it does not amount to a preference, and the school's facilities are
not used in conducting the religious classes. 9
What amounts to a preference has been considered most frequently in
the states in regard to Bible reading in the public schools. The majority of
the states allow the Bible to be read in the public schools, especially if
attendance at such readings is not required. In New Jersey, the reading of
part of the Old Testament and the Lord's Prayer was held not to be sec-
tarian, and therefore, not unconstitutional.' ° Colorado considered the read-
ing of parts of the Old Testament by the teacher, without comment
when attendance by the students was not compulsory, to be constitu-
tional; as not being a preference or an establishment of religion in viola-
iton of the State Constitution." Minnesota held the reading of the Old
Testament without comment to be constitutional. 12 A Georgia case held
an ordinance requiring the reading of the King James Bible in schools
to be in conformity with the State Constitution.' 3 The purchase of the
King James Bible for the school library was held to be constitutional in
a California decision. 14 The reading of the King James Bible and the
TEverson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Four
justices dissented.
8 People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
9 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
10 Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A. 2d 880 (1950). Distinguished
from the Tudor case, as this case only involved the Old Testament and the Lord's
Prayer, not the New Testament as in the instant case.
11 People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927).
12 Kaplan v. Independent School District, 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927).
18 Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1922).
14 Evans v. Selma Union High School District, 193 Cal. 54, 222 Pac. 801 (1924). The
Court did not consider the purchase to be an approval, and so therefore not a prefer-
ence.
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Lord's Prayer where attendance by students is optional was held not to
make the school sectarian in violation of the State Constitution of Texas.15
A minority of states consider Bible readings to be violative of their
state constitutions. The reading of the Old Testament and the New Testa-
ment in schools was held to be a preference of the Christian religion in
Louisiana, and unconstitutional.16 Where the attendance of the children
was required at a Bible reading, an unconstitutional preference was held to
result by the Nebraska Court.' 7 Even where the attendance at a Bible
reading was voluntary, it was held unconstitutional by a Wisconsin case.' 8
Questions of preference, other than those involved in the Bible reading
cases, have been considered by some courts. The holding of religious
meetings in a school-house approximately four times a year, when there
was no interference with the school program, was considered to be con-
stitutional in Nebraska.' 9 In two New Mexico cases the distribution of
sectarian pamphlets on the school premises, placed there by teachers, was
held to be unconstitutional as the fostering of a sect by the school, and a
preference by the school system.20
The Illinois Constitution forbids the use of public school funds in aid
of any sectarian purpose.21 In an early Illinois case a requirement that Uni-
versity of Illinois students attend a short religious service and hymn sing-
ing was held to be constitutional, and considered not to be sectarian.22
However in Ring v. Board of Education,'23 the giving of sectarian instruc-
tion by reading of the Bible was held unconstitutional. The provision for
the excuse of pupils from this reading did not render the program consti-
tutional. Under this holding it appears that Illinois follows the minority
view on the question. The temporary use of school buildings for a reli-
gious meeting was held not to violate the Illinois Constitution.24 The ex-
cuse of children from school for one hour a week at the request of their
parents, to attend religious instruction outside the school premises, was
15 Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908).
16Herold v. Parish Board, 136 La. 1034,68 So. 116 (1915).
17 State v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853,93 N.W. 169 (1903).
18 State v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).
19 State v. Dilly, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N.W. 999 (1914).
20 Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P. 2d 520 (1952); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501,
236 P. 2d 949 (1951).
21 Ill. Const. Art. VIII, S 3 (1870). See also Art. II, § 3 forbidding any preference by
law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.
22North v. Board of Trustees, 137 111. 296, 27 NE. 54 (1891).
23 245 111. 334,92 N.E. 251 (1910).
24Nichols v. School Directors, 93 Ill. 61, 34 Am. Rep. 160 (1879).
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considered constitutional. 25 No charge of preference was made in this
case. In the famous McCollum case, 26 the Supreme Court of Illinois held
the program involving the use of school premises for sectarian instruction
to be constitutional. This decision was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court.27 As previously indicated, the use of school premises for a
purpose considered to be sectarian is almost universally held unconstitu-
tional. Many states have constitutional provisions to this effect,28 and
most others reach it by judicial interpretation. The material to be dis-
tributed in the instant case appears to have been sectarian, and as the
school board was cooperating in its distribution, allowing the use of
school buildings for the purpose, obtaining permission from parents, and
otherwise aiding the project, the effect contemplated amounted to a pref-
erence by the school board of one religious belief over others. The re-
quirement that the state refrain from giving preference to one religious
belief over others is thus met in New Jersey by refusing the aid of the
school system in the distribution of sectarian matter to all. While this
would seem to keep the school system and the state neutral in the con-
test among sectarian creeds, it also seems to grant a preference to the
opponents of religion over those who favor it, which does not seem neces-
sary in order to comply with the Constitution. The requirement that the
state remain neutral in the contest among various religions does not
require that the state adopt an antagonistic attitude toward religion in
general.
CONTRACTS-COMMENCEMENT OF BIDDING AT AUCTION
"WITHOUT RESERVE" PRECLUDES WITHDRAWAL
OF PROPERTY
The defendant, who was part owner of a large estate which included
personalty and realty, employed an auctioneer to conduct its sale. The
auctioneer and the defendant prepared an advertisement which stated
that the proprety was to be sold "without reserve." This advertisement
was published in a daily newspaper and in brochures which were dis-
tributed at the commencement of the auction. Prior to the sale the auc-
tioneer repeated the terms of the advertisement. The defendant and his
attorney were present but made no objection or public correction. The
bidding continued until the plaintiff bid $41,000, which the auctioneer
acknowledged. Before another bid was made, the unsatisfied defendant
25 People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N.E. 2d 305 (1947).
26 People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 111. 14, 71 N.E. 2d 161 (1947).
27 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
28 See e.g., Ill. Const., note 21 supra; N.J. Const., note 1 supra.
